Abstract: This paper presents a new approach for modeling a discrete-event systems under the presence of faults. Input/Output automata are used to represent the nominal and faulty behavior of a plant for fault detection and identification. Assuming that a model of the nominal behavior of a plant is available, it is usually a nontrivial task to derive a model of the plant subject to actuator, sensor and system internal faults. This task often require some expertise or a large amount of data on the faulty behavior of the plant. The key aspect of the paper is the introduction of suitable functions enabling to reduce the amount of information needed to model a faulty behavior. The method presented here fits in the nondeterministic Input/Ouput automata framework where actuator, sensor and internal system faults are considered. The proposed approach is applied to a chemical plant for demonstration.
INTRODUCTION
The diagnosis concept widely established in literature for quantitative and qualitative systems is depicted in Fig. 1 . This paper is dedicated to qualitative modelbased diagnosis techniques. Analytical models represented by nondeterministic I/O automata are used here. One established diagnosis technique relies on a consistencybased check making use of the model of the nominal behavior of the plant N p and a model of the faulty behavior N f p for every possible fault f ∈ F (Fig. 1) . The model of the fault-free behavior N p is sufficient for fault detection which only answers the question whether a fault has occurred or not (Reiter (1987) ; Davis and Hamscher (1988) ; Blanke et al. (2006); Sayed Mouchaweh et al. (2009) 
Fig. 1. Diagnosis of discrete-event process
Motivation. A fault is detected whenever the measurements of the inputs v p and outputs w p are inconsistent with the nominal behavior of the plant N p . That is, the plant deviates from the required behavior. However, this inconsistency with N p is necessary but not sufficient to identify the fault that occurred. For a given set of faults F = {f 1 , f 2 } only a consistency between the measurements and N f1 p makes f 1 a fault candidate. Only an inconsistency between the measurements, N p and N f2 p confirms the presence of a fault and excludes f 2 from the list of fault candidates thus isolates the fault f 1 . Several works as Sampath et al. (1995) ; Lunze and Schröder (2004) have used this fault isolation concept for unobservable fault events and additional fault parameters in the transition functions respectively. This fault identification scheme shows the necessity of models of the faulty behavior.
In addition, the Fault Propagation Analysis (FPA) also make use of a model of the faulty behavior to study the roots and consequences of a fault on a system. The verdict can be used to discover weaknesses of the plant leading to severe consequences and achieve preventive improvements. Furthermore, model-based reconfiguration techniques always make use of a model of the faulty plant to determine the appropriate actions to take in order to fulfill a specification. This shows the importance of a model of the faulty system for different analysis tasks. Davis and Hamscher (1988) and Console and Dressier (1999) give surveys underlining the relevance of fault models for model-based diagnosis. This paper presents a method to obtain the model of such a faulty behavior for actuator, sensor and internal system faults in a systematic way. The quality of the model is an essential criterion for the success of a model-based diagnosis. Hence building appropriate models of the faulty system is a major task of fault diagnosis. This is the main concern of this work. Picardi et al. (2004) ; Sachenbacher and Struss (2003) stressed out the difficulty of building the right model due to the changing context, task and the need of reusability which are in general conflicting goals. However, the model of the faulty behavior N f p presented here is suitable for online and offline diagnosis purposes.
Literature overview. In continuous LTI-systems, a fault can be represented as an additional input to the system and be easily involved in the state space representation due to superposition principle. Similar approaches have been used in discrete-event system by extending the definition of automata for the nominal behavior with a new input representing the fault Lamperti and Zanella (2003); Neidig (2007) . A drawback of the this method is the fact that every transition of the nominal automaton have to be studied to model the effect of the fault in a suitable way. Sampath et al. (1995) obtained the model of the faulty behavior by means of a label propagation function comparable to the composition of the nominal standard automaton behavior with a fault automaton consisting of a nominal state and a faulty state. The transitions are chosen in such a way that after the composition only those states which can be reached by fault events are labeled with the F -symbol representing the fault. The concept of unobservable faulty events for diagnosis is investigated in Tripakis (2002) for timed I/O automata. Contrary to these approaches, faults are not modeled here by means of unobservable events since only events which can be observed or registered by the sensors are considered in the following. Instead of a single unobservable event, a behavioral approach is used here. The fault is represented by a specific behavior of the plant which differs from the nominal one. Moreover, the approach presented here does not require an enlargement of the states of the nominal model with faulty states and new unobservable events, except for failures where the empty symbol ε is used. Only those events and states which are defined in the complete nominal model are reused in the faulty case with different transitions e.g. new self-loops.
The approach proposed in Benveniste et al. (2003) for Petri nets considers faults in components through explicit faulty places with associated labeled transitions. One goal was to find possible scenarios revealing which component could have been responsible for the observed fault. A similar idea is proposed in Ortmeier et al. (2007) for state charts. Instead of these explicit distinction of faulty states and transitions in advance, error-relations are used here and can be applied on every state or I/O transition according to the fault to be modeled.
Another approach consists of a sampling, abstraction and identification of the faulty dynamic of the plant under the influence of faults investigated in Lunze and Schröder (2004) . This is related to the data-driven approaches surveyed by Papadopoulos and McDermid (2001) . This method has proven to provide the most complete behavior of the plant but is costly in terms of experiments, generation of fault prone test sequences and quantizer design which has to be performed.
A common problem is the fact that each fault leads to a separate model and a possibly large amount of data. In addition, it is arduous to heuristically derive a faulty model out of a nominal monolithic model which is usually obtained by composition. A fault in a single component requires an extensive investigation of the consequences on the global plant by considering the interactions among the components, the composition rule and the expertise of the modeler. This paper proposes to reduce the load of this modeling task by means of error-relations describing actuator and sensor faults or failure. In general, the fault modeling task requires a deep knowledge of the system at hand which can also consist of subsystems. Hence also the interaction among the subsystems has to be mastered in order to predict the faulty behavior of the overall plant. No need to stress out how difficult it becomes with growing complexity. This motivates the development of the systematic fault modeling method presented next.
Section 2 presents the setup and context of the work regarding important definitions. The basic modeling framework of I/O automata used in this paper is introduced in Section 3. The modeling of the nominal behavior of a chemical plant is explained in Section 4. The modeling of actuator, sensor and internal system faults is handled in Section 5. The explicit construction of a model of the faulty behavior is explained in Section 6 and applied on the chemical plant case study in Section 7.
FAULT DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION

Definitions
The definitions used here have been selected from different works in the literature, see Blanke et al. (2006) ; Lamperti and Zanella (2003) ; Sampath et al. (1995) ; Simani et al. (2003) . A fault is an unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic property or parameter of the system from the acceptable, usual or standard condition. A failure is a permanent interruption of a system's ability to perform a required function. A symptom is a change of an observable quantity from the normal behavior. In a cause-effect chain, the fault is one or more of the potential causes whereas the symptoms represents the effects.
Usually the FDI-techniques found in literature do not model the real causes of the faults but the effects observed after the fault occurred. As in literature, symptoms are used here to describe faults on a model level. In order to ease the readability, we always refer to these symptoms as faults or failures. Recall that faults considered in this work are supposed to be identifiable, thus the diagnosability condition is assumed to be always satisfied.
Fault classification
The plant is decomposed in three main parts which can be subject of faults:
• actuator which directly control the process: a faulty actuator has an altered actuator behavior, that is an altered input to the process.
• the process: a faulty process with nominal actuators and sensors means a nominal input may drive the process into a wrong state z . This is a faulty destination despite the correct I/O measurements.
• sensors: a faulty sensor falsifies the output of the process hence represents an alteration of the output labels.
Henceforth, it is reasonable to define a fault classification with respect to the impact they have on the model as follows:
• Faulty I/O labels: they consist of faults altering the input/ouput behavior v/w into v /w, v/w or v /w where v and w represent the nominal signals while v and w are for the faulty ones from a state z. The next state z which is the destination of the transition remains unchanged.
• Faulty destinations: they change a transition from a state z to the faulty next state z instead of the nominal one z . The I/O labels remain unchanged.
• Appearing (disappearing) transitions in (from) the nominal model N p .
• Faulty behaviors: they are represented by measurements which are consistent with the behavior of N f p whereas they are inconsistent with the nominal behavior of N p .
In this work we propose a method which incorporates faulty input/output labels, faulty destinations, appearing and disappearing transitions into one faulty behavior represented by N f p .
MODELING BY MEANS OF INPUT/OUTPUT AUTOMATA
Nondeterministic I/O automata
A nondeterministic I/O automaton N of a system is defined as a tuple The dynamics of the automaton is given by
where (z , w, z, v)! means that the transition is defined i.e. the system N moves from state z with the input v to state z and generates the output w. The * symbol in the argument of L(·) means that any value of the corresponding element can be considered according to its symbol set. Note that the subscript p alone stands for the nominal plant N p whereas the superscript f is added for the faulty plant N f p . For a plant N p at step k, for the state subsets Z k , Z k+1 of Z p and an input v k ∈ V p , the sets
are called active output set and active next state set of N p respectively. Figure 2 shows the internal structure of a nondeterministic I/O automaton N p where the SR block is a shift register initialized with some z 0p ∈ Z 0p . It saves the computed set of possible next states Z k+1 ⊆ Z p of N p and sends it out after one step as the set of actual state Z k ⊆ Z p .
Fig. 2. A nominal nondeterminisitic I/O automaton
The completeness property of nondeterministic I/O automata is needed for model-based diagnosis to avoid that a fault is wrongly excluded from the diagnosis result, thus insures that no fault has been missed. Figure 3 illustrates a simplified chemical plant subject to three kinds of fault represented by the bolt symbol: namely the stuck-at-closed actuator V 2, the defect sensor of level 4 and the leakage in the tank TM. Each situation respectively describes an input, output and a state fault.
CASE STUDY: A FAULTY CHEMICAL PLANT
Fig. 3. Mixture preparation process
First, the nominal behavior of the plant is described. The valves V 1, V 2, and V 3 are the relevant actuators of the system controlled by the signals v p . The input v p = 0 models the "close all valves" command whereas v p = i is the "open valve Vi and close the others" command. The states z p of the plant N p are modeled by the states of the tank TM which vary from 0 (empty) up to 5 (full). Five level sensors (LS) permit a discrete measurement modeled by the output w p of the level of the tank TM. Let w p model the result of an inflow or an outflow of the educt, so that w p = z p holds. The complete I/O automaton labeled with v p /w p as depicted in Fig. 4 is obtained. The control objective of the process is to fill the tank TM from level 0 up to level 4, then down to level 1 and back to level 4 in a cyclic way. • The blocking of V 2 causes a stagnation of the educt at the level where this fault occurs. • The defect sensor of level 4 makes that level unobservable hence the controller will keep the valve V 1 open during the filling sequence.
• Assume that the leakage in tank T M reduces the level of educt of one notch at each time step k. Consequently, during a filling sequence the educt inflow will compensate the outflow caused by the leakage, resulting into a stagnation. During an emptying sequence, the level of educt will sink faster as expected an remain at level 1 where the controller would try to fill up the tank again without success.
In this paper, we propose an approach to model the effect of this kind of faults in a systematic way by modeling the faulty behavior of actuators, sensors and the process in order to obtain models of the overall faulty plant.
FAULT MODELING
Main idea
The concept presented in this paper consists of finding a way to determine how the nominal plant would behave under the presence of actuator, sensor and system internal faults. For actuator fault the question to answer is how would the nominal plant behave if its input was corrupted e.g. by a toggled bit, bad communication channel or a cable break which are common faults in the industrial environments. The input-error map Err v (·) is introduced to answer this question. The fact that the faulty plant N f p behaves similarly to the nominal plant N p receiving a corrupted input is exploited. The same idea is extended to sensor faults for an introduced output-error map Err w (·) which represents a falsification of the nominal sensor value w p sent to the controller. Concerning system internal faults, the state-error map is introduced to model faulty state destinations.
Actuator faults
The input-error map Err v (·) is introduced now to model the alternation of the nominal input v p = w c sent by the controller to the plant. Err v is a relation over the input set V p . In the faultless case, the input remains unchanged and Err v (v p ) = v p . If an actuator is considered as faulty, then the input-error map transform the nominal value v p into a corrupted one v ∈ V p . In case of an input failure, the input signal is supposed to be out of the reserved range or unknown. Thus it is supposed to equal the empty symbol ε (See (5)).
(5)
Sensor faults
The output-error relation Err w models the alteration of the nominal output w p = v c sent to the controller. In the faultless case, the output remains unchanged and Err w (w p ) = w p . If a sensor is considered as faulty, then the output-error map falsifies the nominal value w p into a corrupted one w ∈ W p . An output failure occurs if a value is out of range or unknown, hence equals the empty symbol ε (See (6)).
Err w (w p ) = w p faultless case w = w p faulty case ε = w p output failure.
(6)
System internal faults
A system internal fault occurs when neither the actuator nor the sensor but the process is subject to a fault. The state-error relation Err z is introduced to model faulty state transition w.r.t. a specific input. That means it only influences the next state transition in the plant automaton. This results in an alternation, an appearance or a deletion of states transition (See (7)). 
Input failure
We can assume without lost of generality that an input failure leads to a self-loop at the state z p where the failure occurred and a generation of the possible outputs W ap (z p , z p ) which are consistent with the self-loop. The generation of W ap (z p , z p ) means that the sensors still work properly and would eventually reveal the presence of an input failure after running a diagnosis algorithm. In the case there exists no self-loop or the measured value can not be recognized by the sensors, the output is ε. This is formalized by
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Output failure
If the plant is controlled in a closed-loop, an output failure would affect the process after a finite number of steps because the feedback controller would not get the expected value but the symbol ε = Err w (w p ). In this case the behavior of the control loop after an output failure can not be predicted because it depends on the control policy implemented in the feedback controller for the output ε from the plant. In the case of an open-loop, an output failure would have no impact on the process since the controller would not be aware of it due to the missing feedback connection. The characteristic function of a faulty model for output failures reflects a replacement of every transition labeled with the failed output w p by ε as follows:
(9)
State failure
This situation occurs when the process reaches a state z ε which is not covered by the model N p , although the input v p is correct.The nominal sensors correspondingly send a measurement w i in accordance with z ε , which might belong to W p or not. Thus w i ∈ W p ∪ {ε} after a state failure. This is expressed by • the influence of a faulty actuator signal v i on the nominal state transition formalized by Z ap (Z k , v i ) w.r.t. the input-error relation, • the influence of a faulty actuator signal v i on a faulty state transition formalized by the successive evaluation of Err v and Err z . This can be used to model the behavior of a plant which is simultaneously subject of an actuator and a system internal fault. Thus this approach is not limited to faults which do not occur together.
The next state set of the faulty system model is thus
The faulty outputs are obtained by applying the outputerror Err w relation on every output in the transitions contained in (Z k+1 , Z k ). Hence, the faulty active output set is defined by
Z f ap and W f ap are now used in Equation (13) 
